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Abstract 
The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to 
rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if 
backward  compatibility  moderates  this  process  of  rebuilding  an  installed  base.  Using  a 
structural model of the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward 
compatibility lets incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to 
some  extent  but  that  it  also  reduces  supply  of  new  software.  We  examine  the  tradeoff 
between  technological  progress  and  backward  compatibility  and  find  that  backward 
compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. We 
subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward compatibility as a strategy to 
sustain market leadership. 
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1.  Introduction 
Firms  frequently  achieve  a  position  of  (temporary)  market  leadership  in  high-technology 
industries (Lee et al. 2010, Wade 1995). Especially in the early stages of a technology’s life 
cycle, this can lead to a dominant design for a technology (Suarez and Utterback 1995). In 
industries with significant network effects, the tendency for an industry (or a technological 
generation) to be dominated by a single firm or standard is especially strong (Arthur 1989). 
This pattern of market leadership in technology-intensive industries creates incentives for 
firms  to  invest  in  continuous  learning  (Schilling 2002), build a technological  community 
(Wade  1995),  exploit  complementarities  across  products  (Lee  et  al.  2010),  or  engage  in 
aggressive pricing (De Figueiredo and Silverman 2007), among others. Securing an early lead 
can therefore translate into a competitive advantage throughout a technological generation 
(Arthur 1989, Mascarenhas 1992, Lieberman 1989). 
Interestingly,  in  network  industries,  market  leadership  often  persists  across 
generations, which suggests that providers of successful technologies can carry over some of 
their  dominance  to  future  generations.  The  strategy  literature  identifies  a  number  of 
mechanisms by which this intergenerational transfer of market leadership can take place. One 
stream of literature proposes that incumbent firms possess dynamic capabilities developed 
from prior generations that are useful in the new generation  (De Figueiredo and Silverman 
2007, Chen et al. 2012, Danneels 2002, Kotha et al. 2010, Eggers 2012). The core logic here 
is that firms are better at managing a new technology because they have learned how to do so 
in a prior one. Another line of research suggests that firms utilize complementary assets 
acquired  in  a  previous  product  generation  (Rothaermel  and  Boeker  2008,  Hill  and 
Rothaermel 2003, Jones 2003, Tripsas 1997). A specific form of leveraging complementary 
assets from a previous technological generation is to maintain backward compatibility with 
the old generation (Shapiro and Varian 1999). 
Our paper studies if backward compatibility by the market leader can be a strategy to 
sustain market leadership across generations. We pose three questions about the nature and 
implications of backward compatibility in markets with network effects: 
1.  How does backward compatibility influence demand for a new product generation? 
2.  How does backward compatibility affect the supply of new complementary products? 
3.  Are the effects of backward compatibility moderated by technological progress? 2 
We analyze the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, which is well-suited for our 
questions because i) backward compatibility is possible, but not necessary and ii) generation 
changes can be identified clearly. Handheld consoles are especially interesting as they exhibit 
different degrees of technological change across generations, so we can analyze the tradeoff 
between  backward  compatibility  and  technological  progress  across  generations.  Existing 
work  in    the  market  for  home  video  game  consoles  studies  asymmetric  network  effects 
(Shankar and Bayus 2003), changes of indirect network effects over the product life cycle 
(Clements  and  Ohashi  2005),  software  exclusivity  (Corts  and  Lederman  2009)  and 
blockbuster  software  (Stremersch  and  Binken  2009).  While  these  papers  handle  multiple 
generations they do not explore how backward compatibility affects generational change and 
market  leadership,  except  for  Clements  and  Ohashi  (2005),  who  address  backward 
compatibility by adding available games for the Playstation 1 to those of the Playstation 2. 
The theoretical literature on cross-generational or ‘vertical’ compatibility (Katz and 
Shapiro 1994) studies firm incentives for backward compatibility. Waldman (1993) and Choi 
(1994) find that price discrimination increases compatibility incentives, while Kende (1994) 
argues that backward compatibility is more likely as valuations for old and new technologies 
are similar and building an installed base of complementary products is expensive. These 
results are confirmed in a simulation model by Lee et al. (2003), who find that low valuation 
for backward compatibility and a small installed base advantage of the old generation render 
backward compatibility less likely. Nahm  (2008) finds that profits for the incumbent  are 
higher with backward compatibility, which may increase its incentives to upgrade beyond the 
social optimum (Ellison and Fudenberg 2000). From a demand perspective, Shy (1996) finds 
that backward compatibility increases the rate of new technology adoption. 
The  empirical  literature  on  cross-generational  compatibility  finds  that  backward 
compatibility helps carry over some installed base advantage to future generations. Liikanen 
et al. (2004) and Koski and Kretschmer (2005) study intergenerational effects between the 
first  and  second  generations  of  mobile  telephony  and  confirm  the  positive  impact  of 
backward compatibility. Greenstein (1993) finds that buyers are more likely to select a new 
mainframe  computer system  if they own  a compatible predecessor system.  Gandal  et  al. 
(2000)  study  audio  technologies  and  run  a  counterfactual  by  assuming  backward 
compatibility of CD and vinyl. Compatibility would have accelerated diffusion by 1.5 years. 
We estimate demand for handheld video consoles as well as supply of game titles. 
Our estimation strategy builds on Clements and Ohashi (2005), extending their approach to 
account for backward compatibility, console age and the level of technological progress from 3 
one  generation  to  the  next.  Further,  we  identify  console  characteristics  to  allow  for  a 
meaningful comparison between the effects of backward compatibility and increased console 
performance. In line with prior work, we find that backward compatibility positively affects 
demand for a new generation. In addition, we find that: i) backward compatibility works 
through the installed base of software of the compatible parent generation, ii) it increases 
demand  for  hardware,  but  decreases  supply  of  software,  and  iii)  backward  compatibility 
matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. 
We capture a (demand-enhancing) direct and a (demand-reducing) indirect effect of 
backward compatibility. The former directly influences the adoption decision through the 
installed base of software for the compatible parent  generations. This  effect weakens for 
higher technological leaps between generations. The latter works indirectly as old software 
partly substitutes for new software and thus lowers new software demand, reducing software 
supply, which in turn decreases hardware demand. The demand-enhancing effect outweighs 
the demand-reducing effect so that backward compatibility helps transfer network effects 
across generations. Indeed, we find that the market leader, Nintendo, was able to maintain its 
market leadership across multiple generations through a strategy of backward compatibility. 
This paper is structured as follows. We first give an overview of the U.S. market for 
handheld game consoles. We then develop our hypotheses and test them using a model of 
hardware  demand  and  software  supply.  A  discussion  of  our  results  follows.  Further,  we 
analyze the role of backward compatibility in maintaining market leadership by performing a 
counterfactual experiment and considering alternative explanations. Finally, we conclude. 
2.  Industry Background 
The market for handheld game consoles first took off with the appearance of Nintendo’s 
Game Boy in 1989, the first device to sell to the mass market (Forster 2005). Handheld game 
consoles are – just as their (immobile) home video game counterparts – part of a system 
comprising both hard- and software. Hardware manufacturers supply consoles and often also 
software titles,
1 while software providers concentrate on the development and distribution of 
games. Given indirect network effects (Clements and Ohashi 2005), hardware suppliers have 
an interest to encourage development of complementary products, namely game titles. Since 
the ‘Atari shock’ in the early 1980s (when the game console market collapsed due to a sharp 
increase in poor game titles), hardware suppliers actively manage quality of the market’s 
                                                 
1 On average, hardware manufacturers produced 12.8% of game titles for their consoles. 4 
software side: developers need to sign detailed licensing contracts which are then enforced by 
legal and technological means such as security chips (Genakos 2001). This also prevents any 
hardware manufacturer from developing consoles that are compatible with games for other 
platforms. 
Our sample ranges from 1995 to 2007.
2 Industry observers typically separate consoles 
into generations. In industry terminology, we study generations IV to VII (Forster 2005). 
Table  1  provides an overview  of  the consoles  in the generations  we study. It is 
striking that Nintendo – from IV up to VII – was continuously present in the market while its 
competitors changed continuously. Figure 1 illustrates Nintendo’s market share dominance 
over the whole period. We now describe the competitive landscape over the four technology 
generations we cover. 
Table 1: Mobile handheld consoles sold between 1995 and 2007 
Console  Platform  Backward  U.S.  Manufacturer  Hardware 




Generation IV             
  Game Boy  Game  
Boy  No  8/1989  Nintendo  4.2  300 
  Game Boy Pocket  9/1996  148 
  Game Gear  Game Gear  No  1/1991  Sega  3.6  500 
Generation V             
  Game Boy Color  GB Color  Yes  11/1998  Nintendo  8.4  188 
  Virtual Boy  Virtual Boy  No  8/1995  Nintendo  20  760 
  game.com  game.com  No  9/1997  Tiger  10  380 
  game.com Pocket Pro  12/1999  n/a 
Generation VI             
  Game Boy Advance  Game Boy 
Advance  Yes  6/2001  Nintendo  16.7  180 
  Game Boy Advance SP  3/2003  142 
  Neo Geo Pocket Color  NGP Color  No  8/1999  SNK  6.14  145 
  N-Gage  N-Gage  No  10/2003  Nokia  104  137 
  N-Gage QD  8/2004  143 
Generation VII             
  DS  DS  Yes  11/2004  Nintendo  67  275 
  DS Lite  6/2006  218 
  Playstation Portable 
Playstation 
Portable  No 
3/2005 
Sony  333 
280 
  Playstation  Portable 
Slim 
9/2007  189 
                                                 
2 Extending the study period beyond 2007 would be problematic as smartphones (with Apple’s iPhone as the 
most prominent representative) have since then developed to be close substitutes to dedicated handheld game 
consoles. 5 
 
Figure 1: Monthly market shares from 1995 to 2007 
 
Generation IV comprised Nintendo’s Game Boy and Game Boy Pocket, and Sega’s 
Game Gear. At the start of our sample in 1995, these consoles had already been on the 
market  for  some  time.  The  devices  basically  shared  the  market,  with  Nintendo’s  share 
ranging between 60% and 80% and Sega’s moving between 20% and 40% accordingly. 
The generation V console Game Boy Pocket reached market shares exceeding 80% 
from 1998 on. This is remarkable considering that: i) the device was basically a remake with 
a smaller body but the same hardware capabilities as its predecessor, the Game Boy, and ii) 
Tiger  Electronic’s  Game.com,  which  had  superior  hardware  capabilities,  had  also  been 
launched  in  the  meantime.  Nintendo’s  Virtual  Boy  –  in  contrast  to  the  company’s  other 
products – was comparably unsuccessful due to its bulkiness, problems during use
3 and little 
software available. It only reached substantial market share through a harsh price cut aimed at 
reducing stockpiles.
4  The  Game.com  Pocket  Pro,  a  lighter  and  less  bulky  remake  of  the 
Game.com, did not even reach 1% market share. 
The next dominant device was Nintendo’s Game Boy Color, which again was not the 
technically  most  advanced  console  of  its  time.  Its  main  differentiating  feature  was  the 
enormous installed base of backward compatible software titles from its predecessors. While 
its competitors did not have an installed base of existing games, the Game Boy Color could 
build on millions of software copies sold in the almost ten years the Game Boy platform had 
                                                 
3 Nintendo Virtual Boy’s image generation was based on a combination of a LED unit and oscillating mirrors. 
Users had to focus on these mirrors while playing which caused many players headaches. Hence, the Virtual 
Boy bore a warning statement that it may cause headaches from the start of retail availability in the United States 
(Kent 2002, pp. 513-515). 
4 The maximum market share reached by the Virtual Boy was 44%, reached after cutting the initial price of more 

































1995m1 1997m1 1999m1 2001m1 2003m1 2005m1 2007m1
Date
GAME BOY GAME GEAR
GAME BOY POCKET GAME BOY ADVANCE
GAME BOY ADVANCE SP GAME BOY COLOR
GAME.COM GAME.COM POCKET PRO
LYNX 2 N-GAGE
N-GAGE QD NEO GEO POCKET COLOR
NINTENDO DS NINTENDO DS LITE
PLAYSTATION PORTABLE6 
been on the market. Game Boy Color users did not have to wait for availability of new games 
and could buy or swap used games straight away. 
The next generation (VI) started with the Game Boy Advance. The device, which 
featured improved hardware power on the one hand and backward compatibility to Game Boy 
Color games on the other reached market shares close to 100% at the top of its cycle. While 
there was no device on the market at that time matching the Game Boy Advance in terms of 
hardware power, attributing its dominance merely to weak competition would be simplistic. 
Backward compatibility allowed users to draw on a game library comprising more than 46 
million Game Boy Color titles from the outset, which clearly contributed to its success. 
In early 2003 Nintendo launched the Game Boy Advance SP, a facelifted Game Boy 
Advance with identical technology but a new body design and minor screen improvements. It 
matched its predecessor’s success, completely dominating the market at the top of its cycle. It 
prevailed not only over dated devices like the Neo Geo Pocket Color but also over Nokia’s N-
Gage, which had a processor more than 6 times faster than the Game Boy Advance SP. 
At the end of 2004 Nintendo launched generation VII of handheld game consoles. 
Compared to the previous generation, the Nintendo DS was a significant improvement in 
terms of hardware performance. The device was again backward compatible and could play 
Nintendo’s generation VI games. However, in this generation Nintendo shared the market 
with Sony. Sony’s Playstation Portable (PSP) started with a market share exceeding 50% 
and then ranging between 20% and 40%. This is remarkable given that Sony had to start from 
scratch in the business while Nintendo again had a strong installed base of games. The PSP 
was the most powerful handheld console ever and outperformed the DS by far – for example, 
it was nearly five times as fast as Nintendo’s DS. At the end of our study period both players 
Nintendo and Sony launched remakes  of their  consoles:  the  DS Lite  and the  Playstation 
Portable Slim. Both are lighter and possess a smaller body than their predecessors. 
Throughout  the  generations  we  study,  Nintendo  was  successful,  except  with  the 
Virtual Boy. At least part of its success may be due to the enormous installed bases of games 
leveraged by the company through backward compatibility. Sony’s success suggests that such 
dominance may be overcome by significant technological progress. While many companies 
failed in challenging Nintendo with consoles roughly on par, Sony’s Playstation Portable, 
which outperformed Nintendo’s DS by far, gained substantial market share quickly.
5 
                                                 
5 Note that in this industry, success is typically measured in terms of market share.  7 
3.  Hypotheses 
We now derive hypotheses on the effect of backward compatibility on hardware demand and 
software supply. We first discuss how backward compatibility works directly and indirectly. 
We then argue why we expect the effect of backward compatibility to be less strong for larger 
technological leaps. To our knowledge, we are the first to empirically test both the positive 
and negative effects of backward compatibility and the effect of technological progress. 
3.1 Direct influence of backward compatibility on hardware demand 
When an incumbent launches a technologically improved product generation, it usually faces 
competition from two directions: from the incumbent’s parent generation and from products 
offered  by  competing  firms.  The  larger  the  incumbent’s  installed  base  and  the  more 
fragmented the new generation, the more difficult it is to overcome this startup problem, 
causing excess inertia (Farrell and Saloner 1985, Kretschmer 2008) or technological lockout 
(Schilling  2002).  In  markets  with  indirect  network  effects,  firms  face  a  chicken-and-egg 
problem: it is not enough to offer a new video console; consumers also expect to choose from 
a wide variety of games for it (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009, Gupta 
et al. 1999, Gandal et al. 2000). 
Gandal et al. (2000) identify three strategies for markets with indirect network effects 
to  overcome  startup  problems.  Firms  can  (1)  subsidize  hardware,  (2)  increase  software 
availability by forward integration, and (3) make the product backward compatible with the 
parent generation. All three strategies are used in the videogame market. Especially shortly 
after  product  launch,  consoles  are  often  sold  at  or  below  marginal  costs.  Most  console 
manufacturers  also  develop  and  publish  games  on  their  own  to  increase  availability  of 
software for their own consoles (Corts and Lederman 2009). The strategy we focus on in this 
paper is the use of backward compatibility to transfer network effects across generations, also 
widely used in the video games industry. 
In the market for handheld game consoles, backward compatibility implies that game 
cartridges of the parent generation can still be used with the new console generation. If the 
physical format of the game cartridges changes, this may even require a second cartridge 
slot.
6 Backward compatibility is costly for the console manufacturer: the enclosure has to be 
bigger, additional parts are needed, and the processor must be able to process the old games. 
                                                 
6 This was the case for the Game Boy Advance, which had one slot for old Game Boy Color cartridges and one 
for new Game Boy Advance ones. 8 
How  will  backward  compatibility  work  exactly?  Indirect  network  effects  in  the 
videogame industry have so far been measured through the demand-increasing effect by the 
number of games currently offered on the market (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and 
Lederman 2009). One way to assess the effect of backward compatibility could be to analyze 
if and how much the number of games still available for the compatible parent generation 
affect demand for the new generation. Alternatively, the stock (or installed base) of games 
sold for the parent generation would proxy all games that could potentially be used with the 
new console. This measure, which we feel is more plausible since buying old games for a 
new console generation may be somewhat unattractive, implies that a larger installed base of 
compatible games increases the likelihood that a potential adopter has access to some of these 
games and thus benefit from backward compatibility. A person has access to old games if she 
owns the parent console or gets old games from friends or through second-hand trading.
7 
The results by Greenstein’s (1993) support our intuition in another setting: he finds 
the  likelihood  of  adopting  a  new-generation  mainframe  to  be  higher  if  a  firm  owns  a 
previous-generation  mainframe  of  the  same  brand.  Given  the  switch  of  mainframes  is  a 
binary (hardware) decision, while the software used on the previous mainframe can be used 
with  the  new  mainframe,  the  availability  of  existing  software,  and  not  sales  or  software 
development  post-hardware  purchase,  is  what  affects  demand  for  hardware.  This  is 
summarized in our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:   Backward compatibility increases hardware demand more the higher the 
prior generation’s installed base of software. 
3.2 The dark side of backward compatibility 
In addition to the direct effect of complementary goods on the baseline product, backward 
compatibility can also have a negative impact on the new generation. This negative impact 
stems from the fact that complementary goods from both generations are substitutes for each 
other. In the console market this implies that a new console can be used to run games from 
the current generation as well as compatible games from the previous one. Given that most 
games are provided by independent developers,
8 this implies that developers of new ga mes 
will face more competition – not only from competitors in the same generation, but also from 
their predecessors  (Kretschmer 2008).  Given the fixed-cost  nature  of  game development, 
                                                 
7There is a sizable second-hand market for console games. E.g., on eBay.com, as of 24 January 2012, a total of 
108,466 used games for mobile devices were offered. 
8 In our sample, only 12% of games were published by one of the hardware manufacturers. 9 
developers will expect less revenues to cover their (sunk) fixed costs, so that their incentive 
to develop and release new games – basically, to enter the new generation – decreases (Sutton 
1998). Therefore, what may be beneficial for the hardware market because there is a stock of 
complementary goods available may be harmful for the software market because it decreases 
the incentives to develop software for the new generation. This is summarized in our second 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Backward  compatibility  decreases  supply  of  software  titles  for  the  new 
generation  more  the  higher  the  prior  generation’s  installed  base  of 
software. 
 
This hypothesized effect represents the ‘dark side of compatibility’. Therefore, the net 
effect of backward compatibility is determined by two countervailing effects: First, the direct 
effect of backward compatibility suggests that availability of games for the compatible parent 
generation  serves  as  a  (part-)substitute  for  variety  of  new  games,  increasing  hardware 
demand. Second, the indirect effect of backward compatibility implies that the substitution of 
new  games  by  old  games  reduces  new  software  demand,  which  in  turn  lowers  software 
supply, which eventually reduces hardware demand. The effects are summarized in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Dual effect of backward compatibility 
3.3 Backward compatibility and technological progress 
Our final set of hypotheses addresses the potential tradeoff between backward compatibility 
and technological progress. Shapiro and Varian (1999) identify this as the tradeoff between 
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Installed base of 








Indirect effect of 
backward compatibility10 
‘evolution’  (ensuring  backward  compatibility  but  offering  limited  technological 
improvement) and ‘revolution’ (sacrificing backward compatibility, but offering drastically 
increased performance) strategies. However, Shapiro and Varian (1999) conceptualize these 
as decisions based on technological restrictions. The argument is that significant performance 
increases can only be secured by using the latest technology, which in turn makes it more 
difficult or costly to maintain backward compatibility. In our empirical setting, backward 
compatibility is achieved without any performance losses (i.e. an old game runs just as well 
on a new console as on an old one), so that one might assume that backward compatibility is 
perfect and that technological improvements affect demand in general, but not the effect of 
backward  compatibility.  In  other  words,  for  perfect  compatibility  the  degree  of 
substitutability between old and new-generation games is independent of the technological 
gap between the old and the new generation console.  
However, the degree of substitutability rests on the extent to which games exploit the 
technical capabilities of a particular console. As games for the old generation were designed 
with a different set of technological restrictions, new games will differ significantly in their 
performance especially if the set of restrictions imposed by the current generation console has 
changed  considerably  (Shy  1996).  Our  empirical  setting  lets  us  identify  the  relative 
importance of technological improvement and backward compatibility if both are present.  
We  expect  technological  progress  and  backward  compatibility  to  be  substitutes  – 
however, unlike Shapiro and Varian (1999) we assume substitutability to be consumer-driven 
rather  technologically  determined.  The  degree  of  substitutability  of  old  and  new  games 
depends  on  the  relative  performance  of  the  two  game  generations  and  backward 
compatibility. As a large technological improvement on the hardware side permits the design 
of better (i.e. more elaborately programmed) games, an old game will be a worse substitute as 
the technological frontier is pushed out. We thus expect technological progress to have a 
moderating effect on both the demand- and supply side effects of backward compatibility, 
which is summarized in Hypotheses 3a and 3b: 
 
Hypothesis 3a:   The  positive  effect  of  backward  compatibility  on  hardware  demand  is 
negatively  moderated  by  the  degree  of  technological  progress  between 
generations. 
Hypothesis 3b:   The  negative  effect  of  backward  compatibility  on  software  supply  is 
negatively  moderated  by  the  degree  of  technological  progress  between 
generations.  11 
4.  Data and Estimation Model 
4.1 Data 
Data sources 
The core data set for our analysis comes from the market research firm NPD Group and 
consists of monthly unit sales and revenues in the market for handheld game consoles in the 
U.S. for the period from 1/1995 to 11/2007.
9 While, to the best of our knowledge, we are the 
first to use the data about handheld game consoles, NPD data on video consoles has already 
been used for several other studies  (Shankar and Bayus 2003, Clements and Ohashi 2005, 
Corts and Lederman 2009, Stremersch and Binken 2009, Mollick 2012).  
Data on games for the different platforms is also supplied by NPD Group.   The 
software data consists of monthly unit sales and revenue data for all available game titles. For 
each game title, the associated platform is reported.  Note that game data is assigned on a 
platform (not console) level. We define a platform by a common game format. A platform 
can therefore consist of a single console (as for the Game Boy Color) or a family of consoles 
(as for the Game Boy and Game Boy Pocket) that use the same game format but are distinct 
regarding their hardware sales.
10 
Data on technical characteristics of the different consoles are also matched to  our 
data. We use two variables  representing the key dimensions that influence user perception: 
CPU speed as a proxy for processing power of the console and weight as a proxy for the 
console’s mobility. The major data source for these technical characteristics is Forster (2005, 
pp.  212-214).  This  is  completed  with  specifications  from  suppliers’  websites,  console 
databases and console information websites. 
All prices are deflated to enable comparison of console and game prices over the 
entire period. We use the U.S. deflator provided by the International Monetary Fund.
11 We 
use monthly population estimates from the U.S. census bureau to proxy for market potential. 
                                                 
9 We include hardware-only sales, i.e. just the console, and packages comprising a console and a game. Both are 
treated equally in the analysis as (i) package prices do not differ significantly from that of single consoles and 
(ii) a clear separation is not possible with our data. Moreover, many consoles are rarely sold on their own. 
10 The other platforms consisting of two consoles are Game Boy Advance and Game Boy Advance SP, Nintendo 
DS and Nintendo DS Lite, game.com and game.com Pocket Pro, N-Gage and N-Gage QD, as well as 
Playstation Portable and Playstation Portable Slim. There are no platforms with three or more consoles in our 
data set. 
11 We used the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database for this. 12 
Finally, we use USD-JPY exchange rates from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service
12 for a 
price instrument discussed later. 
Variables 
The variables are described in Table 2 and Table 3 reports summary statistics. In line with 
Corts  and  Lederman  (2009),  we  eliminate  the  influence  from  outdated  consoles  selling 
remainders or products that never reached a wider audience by considering only devices that 
sold more than 500 units in a given month.
13  
Table 2: Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
     Market share of console j at time t (relative to market potential) 
     Market share of the outside good (no console purchase) 
     ( )    Within-group market share (share within the handheld market) 
      Available software titles for current format 
     Deflated console price (1995 prices) 
   
        Normalized weight of the console 
   
     Normalized CPU speed of the console  
    
    Installed base of consoles for the current platform format (millions) 
       
     Installed base of games for the compatible parent platform (millions) 
     Age of the console (months) 
         
      Percentage improvement of CPU to compatible parent platform 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
   (        )  502  -8.69  2.09  -13.07  -4.69 
   (     ( )  )  502  -2.33  1.97  -7.71  0.00 
      502  259.04  233.27  3.00  844.00 
     502  95.94  54.69  20.39  298.23 
   
        502  0.00  0.99  -1.57  3.52 
   
     502  -0.01  0.98  -1.44  3.25 
    
    502  11.68  10.35  0.00  34.18 
       
     502  22.78  31.56  0.00  106.83 
     502  35.18  30.67  0.00  131.00 
         
      502  0.65  0.89  0.00  3.02 
 
                                                 
12 Available at http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/. 
13 The mean monthly total number of units sold is 627,068. 13 
Market  shares  in  the  market  for  handheld  game  consoles       ( )    are  directly 
calculated by dividing the monthly unit sales of console   by the total units sold in a given 
month. To derive     and    , we have to define potential market size first. Unlike Clements 
and Ohashi (2005), who use the TV households to determine the number of potential buyers, 
we use the U.S. population numbers as several people in a household can own handheld 
consoles and handheld use is independent of TV ownership. From this, we derive    , which 
is a console’s market share of the market potential
14 and    , the market share of the outside 
good, i.e. the share of potential consumers that do not have a console and do not buy one in 
the given time period. By cumulating the unit sales data of hardware sales, we also derive 
each platform’s hardware installed base     
  15  16. Finally, we divide revenue by units to 
calculate each console’s average monthly price    . All prices are reported in 1995 USD. 
Software variety     is taken from the NPD data. For every platform we count the 
number of game titles with positive sales to obtain    . Therefore,     can decline over time 
if game titles are no longer sold. We also create the software installed base of the compatible 
preceding generation        
   .
17 
The  last  set  of  variables  concerns  the  hardware  characteristics  of  the  handheld 
consoles.  The  dataset  covers  a  twelve-year  period in  which  technological  progress  for 
handheld game consoles was remarkable.  For  example, the mean CPU speed  of active 
consoles grew from 3.93 MHz in 01/1995 to 187.43 MHz in 12/2007. As the data covers the 
entire period this causes problems in compar ing devices’ capabilities. Comparing a  2007 
console that is technically below average to the best device from 1995 would make the first 
one look far too good. We therefore normalize all variables containing technical data by the 
characteristics  of  contemporaneously  active  consoles.  This  is  done  by  calculating  yearly 
mean values and standard deviations for CPU speed and console weight. The yearly mean 
values  and  standard  deviations  obtained  were  then  used  to  construct  a  z-score  for  each 
                                                 
14 The market potential is defined as the size of the population minus the number of people who already bought 
a handheld console. 
15 We do not depreciate the installed base as (absolute) console performance does not deteriorate over time. 
16 At the start of our dataset (1/1995), Nintendo’s Game Boy and Sega’s Game Gear have had already been on 
the market since 8/1998 and 1/1991. We therefore use data from http://vgchartz.com to derive the initial 
installed base of 12.7 respectively 2.9 million units for the Game Boy and the Game Gear. Data is derived by 
weighing the lifetime sales for Americas with the consoles’ 1995 U.S. share from total Americas sales. 
17 As for the hardware installed base, the software installed base for Game Boy and Game Gear is not directly 
available in our dataset. We therefore assume that the number of software titles sold per console in the years 
prior to the beginning of our dataset equals the number of software titles sold for each console in 1995. 14 
console. Finally,          
     is derived as the percentage improvement of the CPU speed 
compared to the CPU speed of the compatible parent generation.
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4.2 Model specification 
We estimate both hardware demand and software supply. In line with prior work on indirect 
network effects, we use a structural model to estimate hardware demand and a reduced-form 
model to estimate software supply (Nair et al. 2004, Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and 
Lederman 2009). The two estimation models are derived below. 
Hardware demand 
We model the demand side of the market using a structural model for hardware demand. Our 
model extends the discrete-choice model for differentiated products used by Clements and 
Ohashi (2005) and Corts and Lederman (2009) with measures of backward compatibility. We 
assume that each  potential adopter    of handheld video consoles maximizes  its  utility by 
choosing the highest      where       represents the different handheld consoles and       
represents the outside option of not buying a console. The consumer’s utility function has the 
following (additive) functional form: 
                                           
                        
                      [         
             
   ] 
                         [             
   ] 
(1) 
The  first  part  of  the  utility  function  represents  the  baseline  model  that  does  not 
consider backward compatibility: utility depends on observed product characteristics    , the 
console price    , software variety    
19  unobserved characteristics    , and the idiosyncratic 
error term     , which can be interpreted as the difference of consumer  ’s valuation and the 
mean utility. 
This model is extended to capture the effects of backward compatibility. First, the 
installed base        
    of the prior generation’s compatible games is added. This variable is 
used  to  test  Hypothesis  1  and  we  expect  it  to  have  a  positive  influence  on  the  buyer’s 
selection  decision.  Second,  we  add  the  improvement  factor  over  the  compatible  parent 
         
      and  its  interaction  with  installed  base          
             
   .  The  improvement 
factor expresses the relative increase in CPU speed compared to the CPU speed of the earlier 
                                                 
18 We set this variable to zero if there is no active parent generation. 
19 As already noted we distinguish between consoles   and platforms   which can consist of multiple consoles 
using the same game format. 
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generation. We expect          
     to have a positive effect on utility as a technological leap 
stimulates demand for a new product generation. In line with Hypothesis 3a however, we 
expect the interaction term to have a negative effect on the buyer’s utility. Further, we add 
console age     as well as an interaction term of installed base and console age,              
   . 
For console age, we expect a negative influence as older consoles are less attractive to the 
remaining  non-adopters.  We  also  expect  a  negative  coefficient  for  the  interaction  term 
between console age and installed base, as we expect the effect of a backward compatible 
installed base to be more important in the launch phase of a new platform generation.  
As  in  Clements  and  Ohashi  (2005),  we  assume        to  be  identically  and 
independently distributed with an extreme value distribution function to generate a nested 
logit model (Berry 1994). Potential adopters decide first to buy a handheld game console or 
not, and if they decide to buy one, they then select a specific console. In contrast to a simple 
logit  model,  substitution  patterns  can  therefore  differ  between  the  decision  of  buying  a 
console and the decision which console to buy. 
Setting the utility of the outside good equal to zero (Berry 1994), we get a linear 
regression equation: 
    (   )     (   )                                 (     ( )  )   
                                          
                     [         
             
   ]   
                                           [             
   ] 
(2) 
Software supply 
We follow prior literature  when estimating  software  supply  (Clements  and Ohashi  2005, 
Corts and Lederman 2009). Software supply is expressed by the variety of different game 
titles     available for a specific platform. We estimate the following reduced-form equation: 
                   
               [          
  ]         
                    
                
        [         
             
   ]
    [             
   ] 
     (3) 
The first line of the equation is the base model with    being brand-specific dummies, 
    
   the installed base of console of the current generation,     the age of the platform, and 
    an error term. We allow hardware installed base to interact with platform age (Clements 
and Ohashi 2005). We extend the model with the same measures of backward compatibility 
as for the demand estimation. Following Hypothesis 2, we expect        
    to negatively affect 16 
software supply as the installed base of backward compatible software might partly substitute 
for demand for new game titles. Further, from Hypotheses 3b we expect the interaction term 
of        
    with relative performance increase to be positive as they reduce the importance of 
backward compatibility on the demand side and we therefore expect less substitution. Finally, 
we again allow for the interaction of our measure of backward compatibility with platform 
age to allow for changing importance of backward compatibility over time. 
4.3 Instruments 
Hardware demand 
The potential endogeneity of the three variables within-group share      ( )  , price    , and 
software variety     requires the identification of appropriate instruments. We use the set of 
instruments  proposed  by  Clements  and  Ohashi  (2005)  and  Corts  and  Lederman  (2009). 
Within-group share is obviously correlated with the error term     as it contains part of the 
dependent variable    . As     is known to firms and consumers in the market (but not to the 
econometrician), differences in unobserved quality might lead to different price setting and 
thus a correlation of the console price     and    . Finally, autocorrelation of     leads to a 
positive correlation between     and the measure of software variety    . 
First, we use exchange rates between the U.S. and Japan as a cost side instrument for 
prices as many consoles come from Japan. Exchange rates seem a valid price instrument as 
their change would probably lead to price adjustment in the U.S. market. However, it does 
not allow for identifying effects at the console level. 
Further, we use the average age of software titles currently available on the market to 
instrument for within-group share and console price. A high average age of games is a sign 
for missing supply of new game titles. Hence, we expect negative correlations of average 
software age both with within-group share as a lack of new games reduces the console’s 
relative attractiveness and with console price as console manufacturers may try to reduce 
counter this adverse effect by lowering prices. 
Finally, we construct several instruments that measure the extent of competition faced 
by a platform (Berry et al. 1995). We use the sum of competing hardware characteristics,
20 
the total number of competing platforms, the number of competing platforms within a 
company, and the number of competing platforms within the same generation as instruments. 
Following Corts and Lederman (2009), these instruments are expected to be correlated with 
                                                 
20 We use the sums of the competing consoles’ cumulative CPU speed and weight. 17 
each of the three endogenous variables: with the within-group share as they affect utility of 
different options, with software variety as they influence incentives to provide game titles, 
and with price as they affect the ability to raise prices. 
Software supply 
The installed base of hardware     
   is possibly endogenous as unobserved shocks in the 
software  market  might  lead  to  increased  software  entry  but  also  to  increased  hardware 
adoption. We use the instruments proposed by Clements and Ohashi (2005) to account for 
endogeneity.  The  average  age  of  software  titles  on  the  market  serves  as  an  instrument, 
although the direction in which the instrument works is not clear. A high average software 
age could either indicate profitable opportunities or tough competition. We also use squared 
platform age and  an  interaction term between  platform age and average software age as 
supply-side instruments. 
5.  Results 
The  2SLS  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  4  (hardware  demand)  and  Table  5 
(software supply).
21 Columns 4-1 and 5-1 report results without the software installed base, 
4-2 and 5-2 include just the linear term of the software installed base, and 4-3 and 5-3 include 
both the interaction terms and the hardware improvement factor. In all specifications, we use 
brand dummies to control for unobserved brand-specific effects as well as  calendar month 
dummies to control for the strong seasonality in console sales . All 2SLS estimations are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. 
   
                                                 
21 The corresponding OLS regression results are available from the authors and show the same sign and 
significance for the hypothesis tests. 18 
Table 4: Hardware demand estimates (2SLS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   (   )     (   ) 
INDEPENDENT  (4-1)  (4-2)  (4-3) 
VARIABLES       
       
SW installed base        
    [millions]    0.0149***  0.0141** 
  (0.00125)  (0.00708) 
Interaction term        
              
          -0.00388*** 
    (0.00139) 
HW improvement          
          0.897*** 
    (0.197) 
Interaction term        
              -0.000314*** 
    (9.56e-05) 
Console age      -0.0239***  -0.0109***  -0.00489** 
(0.00432)  (0.00235)  (0.00233) 
Number of available games      0.00458***  0.000775**  0.00117** 
(0.000608)  (0.000301)  (0.000534) 
Deflated price      -0.00885*  -0.00897***  -0.00708** 
(0.00454)  (0.00256)  (0.00356) 
ln(within-group share      ( )  )  0.795***  0.737***  0.655*** 
(0.116)  (0.0617)  (0.0931) 
Normalized console weight    
        0.261*  -0.254***  -0.322*** 
(0.155)  (0.0921)  (0.102) 
Normalized CPU speed    
     0.174  0.157**  0.169* 
(0.114)  (0.0682)  (0.0854) 
Observations  502  502  502 
R-squared  0.856  0.952  0.958 
Hansen’s J  8.171  34.37  34.45 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation.  Asterisks  denote  significance  levels  (***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1).  
Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported. 
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Table 5: Software supply estimates (2SLS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:     
INDEPENDENT  (5-1)  (5-2)  (5-3) 
VARIABLES       
       
SW installed base        
    [millions]    0.00889  -1.185*** 
  (0.0862)  (0.303) 
Interaction term        
              
          0.597*** 
    (0.0584) 
HW improvement          
          -33.25*** 
    (12.23) 
Interaction term        
               -0.00297 
    (0.00371) 
Format age       -1.305***  -1.298***  -2.080*** 
(0.168)  (0.173)  (0.117) 
HW installed base     
    35.46***  35.45***  39.00*** 
(0.646)  (0.635)  (1.195) 
Interaction term     
          -0.153***  -0.152***  -0.158*** 
(0.0115)  (0.0112)  (0.0126) 
Observations  437  437  437 
R-squared  0.975  0.975  0.982 
Hansen’s J  12.25  13.04  18.15 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation.  Asterisks  denote  significance  levels  (***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1).  
Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported. 
 
We first discuss results for the direct effect of backward compatibility (Hypothesis 1 
and 2) before turning to the moderating effect of technological progress (Hypothesis 3a/3b). 
The control variables in the instrumented estimation results have the expected signs 
over the different specifications. With increasing age, demand as well as supply goes down. 
The interaction term  of age and the installed base of compatible parent  software  is  only 
significant for the demand side, confirming the expectation that the importance of backward 
compatibility declines over time. Further, the industry exhibits indirect network effects as the 
availability of more software variety      positively influences demand and the availability of 
a larger hardware installed base in turn increases software variety. We find negative price 
elasticity of demand and a strong positive seasonal effect (not reported) in November and 
December for both demand and supply.
22 Higher CPU speed increases demand, while higher 
console weight generally decreases demand. These results give us confidence in our model.  
                                                 
22 As the right-hand side of the demand model is the mean utility of console   in month  , the magnitudes of the 
coefficients for the demand model cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way (Corts and Lederman, 2009). We 20 
5.1 Effect of backward compatibility on demand and supply 
We now discuss the first-order effect of backward compatibility on demand and supply. As 
discussed  above,  we  expect  backward  compatibility  to  work  through  the  installed 
base        
    of games for the parent generation. 
Hardware demand 
We first observe that        
    has a significantly positive coefficient for both specifications (4-
2) and (4-3), which supports Hypothesis 1. For specification (4-3), we compare the effect of 
backward compatibility with indirect network effects from software variety    : one extra 
game title for the current generation has the same impact on demand as 82,979 game titles 
sold for the parent generation.
23 Applying this to the case of the  Game Boy Advance, at the 
launch in June 2001 an installed base of 45.6 million compatible Game Boy Color games 
corresponded to the availability of 550 game titles for the new generation. In fact, at launch 
only 21 game titles were available for the Game Boy Advance and it took until August 2004 
for 550 game titles to be available on the market. 
Software supply 
Adding         
     to  the  baseline  specification  as  in  estimation  (5-2),  we  do  not  see  any 
significant effect from backward compatibility. However, in the full specification (5-3), we 
obtain a significant negative effect of        
    on software variety
24. For each million games in 
the installed base, 1.2 game titles less would be offered on the market. Again looking at the 
example of the Game Boy Advance, the installed base of 45.6 million compatible Game Boy 
Color games would reduce software supply by 54 titles at its launch date. This implies that 
absent an installed base, 75 games would have been available immediately from the launch of 
the Game Boy Advance. 
5.2 Backward compatibility and technological progress 
After discussing the direct effect of backward compatibility, we now turn to the interaction 
between backward compatibility and technological progress. 
                                                                                                                                                        
therefore compare the strengths of different effects or discuss marginal effects from exogenous changes of a 
console’s backward compatibility. 
23 The average unit sales of games in our sample are 118,619. 
24 This is intuitive as we find a time-varying effect in (5-3), suggesting that a simple linear term is misspecified. 
Indeed, we find strong serial correlation in the error term in specification (5-1). 21 
Hardware demand 
Our  results  support  Hypothesis  3a,  as  the  interaction  term  has  a  significantly  negative 
coefficient. Combining the counteracting effects of the installed base and the interaction term 
for  specification  (4-3),  we  see  that  backward  compatibility  has  a  positive  effect  if  the 
percentage increase in CPU speed compared to the compatible parent generation is smaller 
than 363%. The largest technological leap between two succeeding generations in our data set 
is the switch from the Game Boy Advance SP to the Nintendo DS. For this generation change, 
CPU speed increased from 16.7 MHz to 67 MHz, an increase of 301%. Here, backward 
compatibility played a much weaker (although still positive) role. This coincides with the 
observation that the Playstation Portable, which entered the market four months later, was 
the  only  console  to  successfully  challenge  Nintendo’s  dominance  in  handheld  consoles 
market – with a much improved technology and up against a less influential installed base. 
Software supply 
The results from specification (5-3) strongly support Hypothesis 3b that higher technological 
progress  between  generations  reduces  the  supply-decreasing  effect  of  backward 
compatibility.  We  see  a  substitutive  effect  from  backward  compatibility  as  long  as  the 
technological leap is smaller than 198%. Therefore, the Nintendo DS with an increase in CPU 
speed of 301% more than outweighs the substitutive effect. 
6.  Backward Compatibility to Sustain Dominance 
Our results suggest a strong effect of backward compatibility on the demand of new hardware 
generations. Since Nintendo was the only firm to launch successive console generations and 
therefore the only firm to report a positive installed base of backward compatible games, we 
ask if backward compatibility was a useful means of sustaining a dominant market position 
over multiple product generations. To isolate this effect however, we need to rule out that 
backward compatibility simply proxies for other unobserved factors – the Nintendo effect. 
We address this in two ways: First, we discuss the brand dummies in our regressions that aim 
to capture unobserved, brand-specific factors. Second, we run a counterfactual experiment by 
assigning one of the unsuccessful consoles, the Game.com console, the installed base of the 
then dominant console, the Game Boy. 22 
6.1 The Nintendo effect 
Table 6 reports the brand dummies for all players in the handheld game console market, with 
Nintendo the base category.  
 
Table 6: Omitted brand dummies from estimation (4-3) 
BRAND   
Sega  0.576** 
  (0.248) 
Tiger  -0.739*** 
  (0.230) 
SNK  0.192 
  (0.395) 
Nokia  0.319 
  (0.759) 
Sony  2.967*** 
  (0.374) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While Sony’s brand dummy has a positive and significant sign – suggesting that both 
brand equity and technological advance played a role in successfully challenging Nintendo, 
the other dummies show no clear pattern. This implies that Nintendo’s reputation does not 
significantly explain its success in repeatedly holding off competition. One explanation for 
Sony’s  success  (and  the  others’  failure)  would  be  that  Nintendo’s  reputation  suffered 
significantly just prior to the introduction of the PSP, which would lead to a significant and 
positive brand dummy for Sony as it measures the reputation relative to Nintendo. However, 
there is no anecdotal evidence for this in the relevant time period. 
Another consideration is that Nintendo’s reputation may have grown over time and 
that the backward compatible installed base (which grew more or less constantly throughout 
our sample) simply proxies for this reputation increase rather than a ‘real’ effect of backward 
compatibility. However, as the Sony PSP entered at the very end of the sample, this would 
make its success all the more improbable as it would have to be based on an implausibly high 
brand reputation  vis-à-vis  Nintendo. However, to  alleviate  this  possible bias, we  run our 
preferred regressions (4-3 and 5-3) using the rolling software installed base        
    of the 
three years before the observation month instead of the overall installed base. The results are 
shown in Table 7 and show a qualitatively similar picture as our baseline results, rendering 
this alternative explanation less likely. 
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Table 7a: Hardware demand estimates (2SLS) for a 3-year rolling window of         
     
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:   (   )     (   ) 
INDEPENDENT  (7-a) 
VARIABLES   
   
SW installed base        
    [millions]  0.0171*** 
(0.00546) 
Interaction term        
              
      -0.00916** 
(0.00360) 
HW improvement          
      1.267*** 
(0.295) 
Interaction term        
          -0.000370*** 
(0.000107) 
Console age      -0.00553** 
(0.00236) 
Number of available games      0.000238 
(0.000733) 
Deflated price      -0.00468 
(0.00398) 
ln(within-group share      ( )  )  0.624*** 
(0.0933) 
Normalized console weight    
        -0.372*** 
(0.112) 
Normalized CPU speed    
     0.0733 
(0.0979) 
Observations  502 
R-squared  0.952 
Hansen’s J  29.45 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation.  Asterisks  denote  significance  levels  (***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1).  
Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported. 
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Table 7b: Software supply estimates (2SLS) for a 3-year rolling window of         
    
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:     
INDEPENDENT  (7-b) 
VARIABLES   
   
SW installed base        
    [millions]  -1.205*** 
(0.325) 
Interaction term        
              
      0.00217 
(0.00532) 
HW improvement          
      -45.50*** 
(16.42) 
Interaction term        
           0.814*** 
(0.131) 
Format age       -1.770*** 
(0.150) 
HW installed base     
    37.94*** 
(1.015) 
Interaction term     
          -0.162*** 
(0.0111) 
Observations  437 
R-squared  0.979 
Hansen’s J  2.929 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation.  Asterisks  denote  significance  levels  (***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1).  
Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported. 
 
6.2 A counterfactual experiment 
To assess if backward compatibility could indeed have played a role in sustaining Nintendo’s 
market leadership by intensifying the startup problem for challenging platforms, we run a 
counterfactual experiment in which we hypothetically assume that games for the Game Boy 
generation can be played on the Game.com console (and Nintendo consoles).
25 In reality, the 
Game.com  console was not  backward compatible to  any other parent  console and  was  a 
commercial failure. Following Corts and Lederman (2009), we derive the counterfactual as 
follows. First, mean utility     for console   at time   is derived from the regression results of 
our preferred specification (4-3). With the nested logit formula discussed in Berry (1994), the 
implied market shares can be obtained as follows: 
 
     
   (    (     ) ⁄ )
  (        )
  (4) 
                                                 
25 Such a move of mandating compatibility with a promising entrant could also be imposed by an antitrust 
authority as a pro-competitive measure (Shapiro 1996). 25 
with     ∑    (    (     ) ⁄ )   . In a next step, we assume that the Game.com console, which 
was launched in 9/1997 could have played titles for the Game Boy. The installed base of 
compatible software titles for the parent generation        
   , the performance increase of the 
Game.com CPU compared to the Game Boy CPU          
    , and the interaction terms from 
equation (2) are adjusted accordingly. We then use the updated values to recalculate mean 
utilities and implied market shares. We repeat these steps for every month in the first year 
since the launch of the Game.com console and report average changes and the actual outcome 
in the top half of Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Average monthly changes (9/1997-8/1998) assuming that the Game.com console 
is backward compatible with software for the Game Boy 







Actual market shares  2.68%  89.03%  5.64%  4.84% 
Predicted market shares base model  2.87%  74.54%  12.42%  10.60% 
Direct effect of backward compatibility         
Unit change prediction vs. counterfactual  + 231,707  - 83,111  - 19,193  - 12,505 
Market  share  change  prediction  vs. 
counterfactual 
+ 71.74%  - 55.29%  - 8.90%  - 7.84% 
Indirect effect of backward compatibility         
Additional unit change  - 23,576  + 6,086  + 1,153  + 892 
Additional market share change  - 4.71%  + 3.70%  +0. 51%  +0. 52% 
 
First off, we observe that backward compatibility leads to an increase in total demand: 
the average additional demand of 231,707 Game.com units is twice as large as the aggregate 
decrease in demand for the competing platforms of 114,809 units. This is intuitive as overall 
network effects have increased. Without backward compatibility, the technologically superior 
Game.com never takes off and the outdated Game Boy Pocket maintains a dominant position, 
as can be seen from Game.com’s actual market share of 2.68%. Assigning the Game Boy’s 
installed base to Game.com changes the dynamics of the market drastically, and Game.com’s 
counterfactual market share is almost as high as Nintendo’s actual one.
27 
In the bottom part of Table  8, we add the indirect effect of backward compatibility, 
which we found to decrease supply of new games. We proceed as follows. We first simulate 
                                                 
26 Nintendo‘s Virtual Boy has only been on the market for the first six months since the launch of the Game.com 
console. 
27 Note that we maintain Game Boy’s backward compatibility so that Game Boy and Game.com have equal 
installed bases. 26 
backward compatibility of the Game.com console by changing the installed bases analogous 
to hardware demand. We then use the coefficients from our supply estimation (5-3) to predict 
the number of available games    . We finally substitute this (lower) number of available 
games in the utility function     of the demand-side equation and can again derive implied 
changes in units sold and in market shares. 
The  indirect  effect  moderates  the  direct  effect  somewhat  (as  game  providers  for 
Game.com would have been deterred by the installed base of backward compatible games 
serving as imperfect substitutes). However, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, so 
that backward compatibility would still have helped the Game.com console capture a large 
chunk of the market at the time. 
7.  Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we  study  the  effects  of  backward  compatibility  in  a  market  with  indirect 
network effects, the U.S. handheld game console industry. Backward compatibility helped 
the  market  leader  Nintendo  maintain  their  market  leadership  over  multiple  generations 
despite  having  an  inferior  technology  in  many  instances.  Backward  compatibility  in  this 
market works through the installed base of games for a compatible parent generation and its 
strength is affected by the rate of technological improvement between successive generations. 
On the demand side, our results lend support to the role of backward compatibility. If 
a new generation is backward compatible with the old one, the installed base of games for the 
prior generation increases sales for the new generation console. However, large technological 
improvements  across  generations  come  at  the  cost  of  consumers  valuing  backward 
compatibility less as their utility from using the old complementary products is comparatively 
low. Therefore, benefits from large technological improvement are partially offset by the 
reduced benefits from backward compatibility. On the supply side, we find that backward 
compatibility lowers the supply of new software, and that this effect is less pronounced for 
consoles with higher technological progress, which suggests that there is a (previously not 
identified) “dark side” to backward compatibility. 
By jointly analyzing hardware demand and software supply, we identify a tradeoff 
between the demand-enhancing effect of backward compatibility directly affecting hardware 
demand  and  the  demand-reducing  effect  that  works  indirectly  through  reduced  software 
variety  for  a  platform.  We  find  that  the  demand-increasing  effect  clearly  outweighs  the 
demand-decreasing effect. 27 
Could backward compatibility have stabilized market structure in the U.S. handheld 
console market by giving Nintendo a head start for every new generation? Sony’s PSP, the 
most  successful  challenger,  entered  with  a  much  superior  technology  at  a  time  when 
Nintendo  had  just  made  a  significant  technological  leap  from  their  previous  generation, 
which is in line with our results that backward compatibility matters less if the generations 
are very different technologically, so that Nintendo was comparably more vulnerable at that 
junction.  To  further  substantiate  the  claim  that  backward  compatibility  helped  Nintendo 
maintain  a  dominant  position  over  technologically  superior  challengers,  we  run  a 
counterfactual and assign Nintendo’s Game Boy installed base to a technologically superior, 
but ultimately unsuccessful challenger, the Game.com console. We find that if Game.com had 
been backward compatible, market leadership would have been reversed. 
Our work relates to the literature on entry deterrence, as backward compatibility can 
discourage firms from entering a market or at least prevent them from attaining large market 
shares. While there are many theoretical models of strategic entry deterrence (Dixit 1980, 
Klemperer 1987, Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Salop 1979, Haan 2003), empirical studies of 
entry  deterrence  are  rare  in  industrial  organization  (Schmalensee  1978,  Smiley  1988). 
Strategy and marketing scholars have focused on limit pricing (Srinivasan 1991), reputation 
(Clark  and  Montgomery  1998)  and  excess  capacity  (Harrigan  1981),  while  Gruca  and 
Sudharshan (1995) integrate a wide variety of entry deterrence strategies in their conceptual 
framework,  in  part  referring  to  product  portfolio  choices  (brand  proliferation, 
preannouncement,  switching  costs).  However,  technological  parameters  are  not  typically 
considered  potential  strategic  instruments  for  entry  deterrence.
28  This is surprising as in 
technology-intensive industries entry is a salient phenomenon, often replacing current leaders 
in the process of creative destruction  (Schumpeter 1942). In this light, our results have both 
managerial and policy implications. Managers in network industries must consider backward 
compatibility an important parameter that  helps stabilize market shares across generations 
and  establish  persistent  market  leadership.  Judiciously  managing  the  tradeoff  between 
backward compatibility and technological progress is thus a key challenge for technology 
strategists.  
                                                 
28 An exception is Church and Gandal (1996), who study compatibility as a means of entry deterrence in a 
theoretical model.  28 
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